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ABSTRACT
Concern has been growing recently that the modern commercial organisation is becoming
less auditable.  The volume and complexity of transactions and the opacity of computer-based
information systems, coupled with the increased knowledge gap between auditors and clients,
make the auditor reliant on evidence whose quality and reliability is open to broad
challenges.  At the same time, the changing nature of financial reports, from summaries of the
past to images of the present and windows on the future, weakens the link between evidence
of underlying activities and transactions and their representation in financial statements.
This exacerbates the epistemological challenge faced by accountants and auditors: how can
financial statements be said to be a faithful representation of an entity, and how can auditors
give a well-grounded opinion that the financial statements give a true and fair view?  These
issues are by no means unique to financial reporting.  Similar problems arise in historical
research, where historical theorists and practical historians have had to grapple with the
nature and status of evidence of the past and the relationship between evidence and historical
narratives.  By examining contemporary debates within the literature of historiography,
insights into comparable issues within financial reporting and auditing should be gained.
The paper concentrates in particular on the contribution to the historiographical debate made
by Keith Jenkins.  Through his books Re-thinking History (1991), On “What is History?”
(1995) and Why History?  Ethics and Postmodernity (1999), and his edited collection  The
Postmodern History Reader (1997), Jenkins has provocatively challenged more mainstream
views of the historian’s relationship with evidence, indeed the nature of historical evidence
itself, in ways that raise issues for the conventional understanding of evidence in the audit
context.  The arguments of Jenkins are contrasted with those of C. Behan McCullagh, whose
The Truth of History (1998) explicitly explores the extent to which historical descriptions can
be “true and fair”, and thus provides a direct analogy between the task of the historian and
that of the auditor.  The paper concludes that auditing stands or falls in an epistemological
sense with history, in that the statements of auditors bear essentially the same relationship to
audit evidence as those of historians bear to historical evidence.  If, in a postmodern world,
histories that claim to tell a unique “truth” are not just logically impossible but also ethically
immoral, then so are financial statements and audit reports.THE AUDITOR AS HISTORIAN:
REFLECTIONS ON THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF FINANCIAL
REPORTING
INTRODUCTION
“In practice most historians assume that when their statements about the past are
adequately supported by available evidence, then it is reasonable to believe them true.
Precisely what constitutes adequate support is hard to say” [McCullagh, 1984, p. 1].  In any
practice that claims to make or critique statements about the way the world is or was, two
fundamental epistemological questions arise.  The first of these is: “by virtue of what factors
are our statements true or false?”  The second question is the one posed by McCullagh in the
opening sentences of his study in the philosophy of history, and quoted at the beginning of
this essay: “when is it reasonable to believe statements to be true or false?”  These are not
necessarily the same question, as it is possible to conceive of situations where it is reasonable
to believe a statement to be true, but the statement is in fact false.  Whatever criteria we have
for deciding on the reasonableness of belief, these will inevitably be a finite set, and it will
always be possible to identify a statement that satisfies the criteria but is nonetheless false.
The only apparent way of avoiding the dilemmas that this creates is extreme scepticism,
where we assert that we can never have sufficient reasons for believing any statement to be
true.
1
However, as McCullagh notes, while anyone who rejects extreme scepticism will hold
that there will be some circumstances in which it is reasonable to believe statements to be
true, trying to give an adequate account of these circumstances is difficult.  Philosophers
make a sport of developing counter-examples to any such account [Lehrer, 1990, pp. 16-17].
In our everyday lives, we are likely to have a wide range of reasons for believing certain
                                                
1It is often argued that this statement is self-refuting, as, if it is reasonable to accept extreme scepticism,
then there is at least one statement that we have reasonable grounds to believe to be true, but then extreme
scepticism must be false.- 2 -
statements and denying others.  Our standards are not necessarily the same from one person
to another.  We may label as “credulous” those who tend to accept as true many statements
that we personally would doubt, and as “sceptics” those who tend to doubt many statements
we would accept as true, but these are relative labels.  Moreover, we will be aware of
occasions when we have personally been too quick to accept, or too slow to deny, statements
that later we come to believe not to be the case.  While our individual standards for what
philosophers call “justification” reflect our personalities, within the arenas of shared activity
we might hope for common standards of justification.  This applies in particular within
professional domains where the making of statements is a fundamental activity, such as
academe and the professions.  The worlds of the historian and the auditor are two such
domains.
In recent years, both historians and auditors have come under challenge.  This
challenge does not relate to particular instances of “bad” history or “bad” auditing, although
there have been plenty of claims about both of these.  The problem goes deeper: it is argued
that historians can never be completely justified in believing that their accounts of the past
are true, while auditors can never be sure that their audit opinion (that financial statements
“fairly present” or “give a true and fair view of” the underlying financial position and
performance of an entity) is valid.  Michael Power in particular has pointed out how auditing,
rather than being a “derived and neutral activity” [Power, 1996, p. 289], “actively constructs
the legitimacy of its own knowledge base and seeks to create the environments in which this
knowledge base will be successful” [Power, 1996, p. 291].  If auditing is essentially a
constructed activity, then the criteria by which auditors feel justified in asserting their audit
opinions are themselves constructed rather than given, and moreover are located in history
rather than being ahistorical.
In the modern audit, the audit opinion is firmly grounded in the process of gathering
evidence.  “Auditors should obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to be able to draw- 3 -
reasonable conclusions on which to base the audit opinion” [SAS 400.1: APB, 1995a, para.
2].  However, this requirement begs the questions of what  is meant by “sufficient”,
“appropriate” and “reasonable”, as well as the processes by which the auditor draws
conclusions from the evidence and derives the audit opinion from the conclusions.  Although
Auditing Standards, textbooks and professional literature attempt to provide answers to these
questions, these may be considered “internal”, in the sense that they are heavily influenced by
the current practices of auditors.  If such practices are likely to be considered reasonable by
“outsiders” precisely because auditors themselves consider them reasonable, then they can be
taken as constituting a practical response to the question: “what must an auditor do to be
justified in expressing an opinion that financial statements give a true and fair view?”  But if
outsiders are suspicious of auditors, then they may apply their own criteria in assessing
auditors’ judgements, and these criteria may lead to a conclusion that certain judgements are
inadequately justified.
Recently, Alexander [1999] has attempted to provide a “benchmark” by which the
adequacy of published financial statements (rather than audit opinions) may be judged.
Alexander is not clear as to what he means by “adequacy” in this context, although he is
aware that it covers both of the epistemological issues mentioned earlier in this essay: “Our
question, in its simplest form, is: what would make, and how can we go about establishing
what would make, adequate financial statements?” [Alexander, 1999, p. 239, emphasis in
original].  Alexander suggests three broad approaches: a general fundamental concept (such
as the “true and fair view”); a set of concepts, rules or conventions (such as a “conceptual
framework” or “statement of principles”) to be applied consistently in all cases; and detailed
specification of accounting practice for all expected situations.  So the preparer of a set of
financial statements might assert that the statements are adequate because they give a true and
fair view, or that they have been prepared in accordance with a given statement of principles
consistently applied, or that they comply with detailed provisions in all particulars.  The role- 4 -
of the auditor, however the audit report is worded, is essentially to come to a judgement on
the preparer’s assertion, and in Alexander’s language, the auditor must be able to establish
that the financial statements are “adequate” according to whatever criterion or criteria are
used to define adequacy.  At the same time, the auditor’s judgement must itself be “adequate”
by reference to criteria of justification within auditing.  However, we characterise them, these
notions of adequacy are likely to be different, giving rise to the situation that an auditor’s
opinion on a set of financial statements may be adequately justified even though the
statements themselves do not satisfy the criteria for financial statement adequacy.
2
Even if the criteria by which the audit opinion is in practice considered justified
emerge from the activity of auditing, we can still ask a “meta-question”: is it appropriate to
look to such internal criteria for justification?  Does this not simply protect current practice
from criticism, in the sense that any audit properly conducted in accordance with current best
practice must give rise to an adequately justified opinion?  Indeed, is an attention to practice
simply a mechanism by which auditors are able to shift attention away from the constructed
nature of practice, and suggest that the audit approach is neutral and ahistorical [Power,
1996]?  In order to understand the issues more clearly, this essay attempts to compare the
questions that have been posed about the epistemological status of the audit process with
those raised in an apparently different, but, as I shall argue, remarkably parallel, field, that of
historical research.  In the next section of the paper, the parallels between the audit process
and that of the historian will be drawn out, and limitations of the comparison will be
discussed.  The third section of the paper explores current debates about the extent to which
historical knowledge is possible, based on the work of two influential historiographers: Keith
Jenkins and C. Behan McCullagh.  The arguments raised by these writers are turned back on
auditing and financial reporting in the fourth section, which leads to a short conclusion.
                                                
2A trivial example of this would arise where auditors disagree with the accounting treatment of a matter
in the financial statements, the effect of which is so pervasive that the financial statements are seriously
misleading [SAS600.8, APB, 1993, para. 74].  Here, if the auditors are justified in expressing an adverse- 5 -
AUDITORS AND HISTORIANS
When historians want to discover what happened in the past, they feel
constrained to find evidence which will enable them to draw inferences about
the people and events which interest them.  This constraint seems perfectly
reasonable, because it has long been thought both the necessary and sufficient
means of discovering the truth about the past [McCullagh, 1998, p. 20].
As McCullagh notes, statements made by historians have traditionally been
considered as requiring a grounding in evidence to be admitted into the set of statements that
can potentially be true.  Without evidence, the historian is free to speculate, but such
speculations cannot be claimed as true in the sense that they represent justified statements
about the past.  Historians are not, however, limited to a mere recitation of their evidence:
they may use the evidence as the basis for drawing conclusions, so long as the latter are
adequately argued from the evidence.  Of course, what counts as an “adequate argument”
may be open to debate, and what is accepted as such may change from period to period
[Evans, 1997, pp. 93-94].
3
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
In Figure 1, the process of historical research is represented very schematically.  At
the bottom, forming the foundation for writing history, are the various occurrences that
interest the historian.  In some cases, the historian will have direct personal experience of
certain occurrences, and may actually have participated in them.  But in general, the historian
is reliant on the traces that the occurrences have left: the documents and artefacts, and the
memories of participants that can be obtained through oral testimony.  The historian’s
evidence is in general some form of record, but not every occurrence will be recorded, while
                                                                                                                                                       
opinion on the financial statements, the statements cannot at the same time meet a criterion of adequacy as
understood by Alexander [1999].- 6 -
some apparent records may not reflect actual occurrences (they may have been created in
error or with a deliberate attempt to misrepresent what had occurred).  To the modern
professional historian, such “primary” sources form the basis for historical narratives and
interpretations, and gaining an understanding of where potentially relevant records may be
found, how they may be read, and how reliable particular records may be in providing
evidence of what happened, form a central part of the training of historians [Black and
McRaild, 2000; Marius, 1999].  In practice, the primary records utilised by the historian have
often already been put into structured form, usually in archives but also in published
volumes.
4  While the archiving process introduces structure and order to primary documents,
it may also lead to the loss of certain documents that do not fit the archivist’s scheme of
arrangement, or for which space may be deemed not to be available (to say nothing of the
opportunity for documents to be deliberately retained or removed in order to emphasise
certain aspects of the past and suppress others).
The upward-pointing arrows in Figure 1 indicate the increasing selectivity and
abstraction in the move from the original occurrences to the historians’ narratives and
interpretations.  At each stage, detail may be lost and agreement between the documents and
the underlying events may be blurred.  The downward-pointing arrows in Figure 1 show the
extent to which histories are based on the underlying evidence.  In practice, much historical
writing is grounded in the archive.  Historians’ professional reputations may often be made
by locating hitherto unused material that has been ordered in an archive, or even unstructured
material (whether this is stored in an archive or not).
5   However, access to the actual events
                                                                                                                                                       
3 Page references to Evans [1997] relate to the “new edition with an extensive new afterword”
published circa 2000.
4 The latter often applies in the case of original documents that modern scholars will find difficult to
read without specialist training.  Hence many medieval documents have been transcribed and historians may
tend to use the transcriptions rather than the originals (for example, Noke [1981] in his study of medieval
English manorial accounts, uses several sets of transcribed records).  In his study of the records of the East India
Company, Bryer [2000] makes use of the  Calendars of State Papers, which transcribe, and on occasion
summarise, original documents.
5 Evans [1997, pp. 87-88] tells of how, in working in the Hamburg state archives, he came across a
catalogue entry for “Worthless Reports”.  On investigating, he found that this entry represented some 20,000
unclassified police reports from the 1890s and 1900s, which provided a wealth of information about the- 7 -
in which the historian is interested is a more problematic matter.  The shadowy arrow linking
histories with occurrences is intended to indicate that, on occasion, the historian has personal
knowledge of and experience of events.  But even here, the experience is mediated through
the historian’s memory, and in general this can be only a minor and accidental source of
historical evidence.
Figure 1 does not reveal the extent to which histories are based not only on sources
documenting the original events but also on the work of other historians.  It is rare for a
historian to be the first to investigate a particular set of occurrences, and histories are often
critiques (implicit or explicit) of the work of prior historians.  Evans [1997, pp. 93-94]
suggests that the move from a heavy reliance on the work of “chroniclers and other secondary
or derivative sources” to a “practice of always going to the primary or original sources” in the
early 19th century has been widely associated with the emergence of history “on a
professional or scientific basis”.  This means that each history does not stand alone, based
entirely on original sources, but rather that histories form an ongoing “conversation” in which
a new contribution may be offered as “a useful corrective to earlier historical interpretations”
[Evans, 1997, p. 88].  The basis of such a “corrective” may range from hitherto unknown
documents or other traces of the past to new interpretations of a common set of evidence.  It
may even involve a painstaking demolition of the historical claims of another writer.
6  In
order to undertake such critiques, historians need to appeal to standards of historical research
and argumentation as well as to primary and secondary evidence.  These standards change
through time, and in their judgements of colleagues and predecessors, historians need to be
careful not to suggest that previous historians were incompetent when, by the standards of
                                                                                                                                                       
thoughts of “rank-and-file socialist workers . . . about almost every conceivable issue of the day”.  Evans notes
that the records had survived by luck rather than conscious decision, and that the records became significant as
evidence of the past only when historians became interested in the history of everyday life rather than of
political organisations.
6 Evans himself provides one of the leading recent examples of this in his debunking of the use of
historical evidence by the holocaust denier David Irving, arising out of Evans’s work as the leading defence
expert witness in Irving’s unsuccessful libel action against Deborah Lipstadt (author of Denying the Holocaust- 8 -
their own times, they were justified in reaching their conclusions (for example, if they used
all the evidence then available, or at least everything that then counted as evidence).
It is important to stress again that historical research is not simply the identification,
transcription and summarisation of original sources: it generally involves interpretation,
taking the form of structuring the events evidenced by the sources into some narrative, and
often seeking to explain why certain events (and not others) occurred how and when they did.
It is not necessary to agree fully with Keenan [1998, p. 650, following Graham, 1983] that
explanation is a logically necessary aspect of “giving a history” to note that it is an activity
undertaken by many historians.  Historians are likely to wish to give their readers the “best”
explanation possible of the events they study, and various canons of “best practice” have
developed among professional historians (see, for example, McCullagh, 1984).   Often, these
canons are taken together with core beliefs about the relationship of historical traces and the
underlying occurrences that they purportedly document: that, in general, and allowing for
some degree of error, the traces faithfully represent the underlying occurrences.  If given the
choice between two rival explanations, one taking most documentary evidence at face value
(even if it is critical of some documents), and the other asserting that most documentary
evidence is erroneous or even fraudulent (even if it accepts some documents), virtually all
historians would almost instinctively reject the second explanation.  They would assert that, if
we must be sceptical as to the reliability of any documentary evidence, then historical
research is simply impossible.  However, historians are often open to persuasion, by
providing them with broader supporting arguments, perhaps appealing to other evidence, that
the second explanation may at least be tenable.  Some historiographical debates centre on
whether particular documents are genuine or not.
Just as the historian’s task is to make statements that are believed to be true, that are
grounded in evidence but built up through argument, so the auditor also works with evidence
                                                                                                                                                       
[Lipstadt, 1993]) and Penguin Books.  Owing to the bizarre nature of British libel laws, no publisher has yet- 9 -
and argument.  Alex. Arthur has recently proposed that “the audit argument (including the
elements of the argument that support the evidential statements) is a more important focus of
fundamental audit enquiry than the evidential process itself” [Arthur, 2001, p. 263].
Traditionally, much weight had been placed by audit theorists on the nature and quality of
audit evidence, but Arthur argues that theorists, and practitioners, often adopt a “common-
sense” epistemological framework.  This typically involves a naïve “correspondence” theory
of truth, where a statement is true because it states what is the case (and “what is the case” is
understood directly and unproblematically), and may appeal to legal or scientific notions of
evidence and inference.
7  When auditors attempt to clarify the status of evidence and the
processes of making inferences, their statements are often assertional and lacking in reasons
(see, for example, SAS 400 [APB, 1995a]).
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2 has been constructed to bring out similarities between the audit process and
the process of historical research.  The upward-pointing arrows show the process by which
the underlying transactions and events undertaken by and affecting an entity are transformed
into the entity’s financial statements.  Transactions and events are evidenced by unstructured
traces, such as invoices.  These will normally include all details about a transaction that the
entity considers relevant, although they may need to be supplemented by other documents
and by human memory.  This closely parallels the situation for the historian, who is likely to
wish to “triangulate” the information about occurrences and events given by one trace against
that given by other traces.  Unstructured traces are summarised in more structured form in the
entity’s accounting records.  Much detail is omitted (for example, the records may show only
an invoice number and total amount, not the goods or services provided) or summarised (for
example, only the daily total for cash sales may be recorded, rather than the individual sales
                                                                                                                                                       
dared to publish this book [Evans, 2001] in the UK.- 10 -
transactions).  Finally, the financial statements are prepared from the accounting records
(with some input from knowledge of external and internal events that may have an impact on
numbers emerging from the accounting records, such as doubt about the collectibility of an
account receivable).  Accounting systems are often designed so that those charged with
preparing the financial statements may do so on the basis of balances and totals automatically
generated within the accounting records, and thus do not need to make much if any reference
to the underlying “primary” evidence of transactions and events.  One of the central purposes
of the accounting records is precisely to facilitate the preparation of the financial statements.
Here, the financial reporting process differs from the process of historical research.  In the
latter process, the historian makes use of materials that have not primarily been created to
facilitate the writing of history.  Although it is possible that the retention of materials, and
their structuring in archives, is partially undertaken to make the historian’s task easier, the
main purpose for keeping records (other than inertia) is to provide evidence of what an
individual, group or organisation has done, perhaps in case of subsequent disputes.  The latter
is certainly one reason for preparing accounting records, but not the main reason.
In Figure 2, it is important to note that the upward arrows do not go all the way to the
topmost level, the audit report.  This is because, in modern practice, the audit report is an
opinion about the financial statements, not a summary of the statements.  The role of the
auditor is not to prepare the financial statements, and corporate law makes it clear that
preparation is the responsibility, in the case of companies, of the corporate officers (in the
UK, the directors).  In practice, auditors may well become involved in preparation work, but
this leads to problems of independence, as auditors are then required to give an opinion on
financial statements for which they are partially responsible.  Figure 2 does, however, make
clear the parallels between the audit process and that of historical research in the shape of the
downward-pointing arrows.  The main source of evidence on which the audit report is based
                                                                                                                                                       
7 This is an argument developed by Power [1992] for the use of statistical sampling techniques in- 11 -
is the financial statements themselves.  With the increasing use of analytical review [Dunn,
1996, pp. 133-135; Gray and Manson, 2000, pp. 333-343; Porter et al., 1996, pp. 165-169;
SAS 410, APB, 1995b], much audit work concentrates on ensuring the internal “coherence”
of the financial statements, rather than their “correspondence” with some external state of
affairs.  Auditors also examine the accounting records, but to a lesser extent the primary
documents evidencing underlying transactions.  In the modern audit, reliance on systems of
internal control allows the auditor to assume that, as long as the control system may be taken
as reliable, the entries in the accounting records, and the documents underlying these entries,
accurately reflect real transactions.  With the increasing use of computer-based accounting
systems, the underlying “documents” may only exist in virtual form anyway, or may be
destroyed once they have been reflected in the accounting records.
As was the case in Figure 1, there is a shadowy arrow in Figure 2, linking the audit
report to the underlying transactions and events.  Auditors rarely observe routine transactions
(and the evidential status of observation is open to question, as the presence of the auditor
may distort the behaviour of those involved in the transaction, making it unrepresentative of
transactions in general).  It is more likely that the auditor will be aware of external events that
may affect entities in general, such as natural disasters, changes in tax and interest rates, and
insolvency of major businesses, and can bring this awareness to bear on a particular entity’s
financial statements.  However, as for the historian, the auditor does not in general have
direct personal access to the underlying activities and occurrences that feed ultimately into
the financial statements.  For some activities, this may not matter too much, as the written
traces may actually constitute the activity to all extents and purposes.  For example, the
mailing of a cheque to a supplier is the making of a payment, and the cancelled cheque,
corroborated by an entry on the bank statement and the supplier’s statement, will be
                                                                                                                                                       
auditing.  McCullagh [1984, ch. 3] considers the use of statistical inference in arriving at historical statements.- 12 -
considered by any auditor as convincing evidence that the payment has been made and has
been received by the appropriate recipient.
The audit process is, as Gray and Manson [2000, p. 333] note, a “search for
evidence”.  Auditing standards, as well as audit theorists, provide criteria for judging the
status of different types of evidence.
8  Certain types of evidence, and evidence from certain
sources, will be considered more reliable than other types of evidence.  Auditors’ judgements
as to the reliability of evidence are quite similar to those made by historians.  In particular,
auditors start from the presupposition that the accounting records have been compiled with
the basic purpose of accurately recording genuine transactions so as to facilitate the
preparation of the financial statements.  Although auditors will assess the extent to which the
internal control systems are operating effectively, the presumption is that this is the case, just
as historians presume  that primary documentary records correctly record genuine
occurrences.  These presumptions may be rebutted if other evidence suggests that they are
difficult to support, but at least auditors have both longstanding judicial authority and more
recent support in auditing standards for their approach.  As long ago as 1896, the famous
dictum of Lord Justice Lopes in re Kingston Cotton Mill Company (No. 2) ([1896] 2 Ch.
279)
9 made it clear that:
[The auditor] is a  watch-dog, but not a bloodhound.  He is justified in
believing tried servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the
company.  He is entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon their
representations, provided he takes reasonable care.  If there is anything
calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to the bottom; but in the
absence of anything of that kind he is only bound to be reasonably cautious
and careful.
                                                
8 See, for example, SAS 400 Audit Evidence [APB, 1995a], and, for a summary and review of the
theoretical literature, Arthur [2001, pp. 252-255].- 13 -
More recently, the responsibility of the auditor has been stated as being to “carry out
procedures designed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence . . . to determine with
reasonable confidence whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement”
(SAS 100.1 [APB, 1995c]).  This indicates a point where the analogy between the auditor and
the historian needs to be moderated.  One of the qualities by which professional historians are
judged is the care with which they address their primary sources.  Historians who are content
that their histories “are free of material misstatement” are likely to be criticised by their peers
on the basis that carelessness with sources makes it difficult to lend credence to their
conclusions.
10  However, the auditor will be prepared to overlook immaterial errors in
financial statements and in underlying records.  Financial statements may “give a true and
fair view” even when they are known to contain errors.
There are areas where the analogy between the auditor and the historian is less strong.
The audit report itself, as already noted, is an opinion on financial statements, not the
statements themselves.  It is thus more like the criticism of the work of other historians that
might be contained in a historical book or paper.  The auditor is in this context more akin to
the historiographer than to the historian.  Moreover, the audit report follows a stylised form,
while the writings of historians are many and varied in style.  The importance of being able to
justify the audit opinion is also different.  Auditors are increasingly being sued for negligence
[Napier, 1998], and need to be able to show that the audit was properly carried out and that
the opinion was properly based on evidence.  What constitutes a proper audit is increasingly
determined by auditing standards, but whether a particular audit has been properly
undertaken is a matter for the courts to decide in the light of expert evidence of acceptable
auditing practice.  If the auditor is held to have conducted the audit negligently, then
                                                                                                                                                       
9 See Napier [1998] for a review of this case and others that determined the bounds of the auditor’s
duties and liabilities in the UK.
10 Evans [1997, pp. 116-122] gives extensive discussion to a case involving a book by David Abraham
The Collapse of the Weimar Republic [Abraham, 1981], which was strongly criticised for misusing its sources.
Abraham claimed that his archival abuses did not affect his overall conclusions, but Evans [1997, p. 121]- 14 -
substantial legal damages will be payable.  For historians, however, the risks of carelessness
or negligence in undertaking research are almost certainly going to be limited to effects on
their careers, and will rarely result in litigation.
11  Yet even here there remains a parallel
between auditors and historians.  If auditors are able to demonstrate that the conduct of the
audit, in the form of  evidence-gathering, meets the standards of an adequate audit, then
attention will be given to how well their conclusions are supported by the evidence.
Similarly, if historians cross the threshold of using their sources in accordance with current
professional practice, then they will be judged by the quality of their arguments.  If the
evidence-gathering process is adequate and the conclusions and interpretations drawn are
well supported by arguments, then auditors and historians alike will be able to resist criticism
that the outcome of their work (the audit report or the history) is unjustified.  This is so even
if subsequent work, perhaps using different evidence and forming different arguments,
undermines the conclusions reached.
Despite some differences, the parallels between the auditor and the historian are
strong, and this suggests that arguments about the foundations of historical research may be
transferable to the context of auditing.  In the next section of this essay, I shall consider two
types of argument about historical research.  These are the relationship of historical evidence
to the underlying occurrences and events, given that the historian in general does not have
direct access to the latter; and the nature of historical argument and interpretation.  The
arguments will be explored by reference to the work of two leading writers on the philosophy
of history: Keith Jenkins and C. Behan McCullagh.
                                                                                                                                                       
expresses the view that “while Abraham did not deliberately falsify evidence, he was extremely careless with it,
far more so than is permissible in a work of serious historical scholarship, or indeed in any work of history”.
11 The David Irving case referred to in note 6 is one of the rare examples where history is litigated.- 15 -
ARGUING ABOUT HISTORY
Keith Jenkins’s most widely-read writings are his books Re-thinking History [Jenkins,
1991], a brief and clear exposition of important philosophical and methodological issues in
historical research and the post-modern response to these issues; On “What is History?”:
From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White [Jenkins, 1995], a more extensive study that
juxtaposes E. H. Carr and Geoffrey Elton, as representatives of a more “modern” and
traditionalist conception of history, with Richard Rorty and Hayden White (neither of whom
is, strictly speaking, a historian) as representatives of the post-modern challenge;  Why
History? Ethics and Postmodernity [Jenkins, 1999], a conscious polemic aimed at showing
“that postmodern ways of thinking probably signal the end of history” [p. 1], not in the sense
of writers such as Fukuyama [1992] that the major conflicts that defined the historical
development of the world were now over, but rather in the sense that history, as an attempt to
discover the unarguable truth about the past, was now conceptually impossible; and the edited
collection The Postmodern History Reader [Jenkins, 1997].
Because much of Jenkins’s writing is presented as a critique of the work of others, it
is not always straightforward to gain a clear sense of what he is saying.  His early book
[Jenkins, 1991] is the most accessible of his writings, and contains some fairly uncontentious
claims as well as others more open to debate.  Jenkins emphasises that there is a difference
between “the past” (“all that has gone on before everywhere” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 6]) and
“history” (“that which has been written/recorded about the past” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 6]), and
that history in the latter sense is a discourse (or series of discourses).  History exists as
writing, and its sources are basically documentary, so there is a fundamental  ontological
distinction between “the past” and “history”.  Moreover, “the past and history are not stitched
into each other such that one and only one reading of any phenomenon is entailed” [Jenkins,
1991, p. 8].  However, traditional historians wish to “stitch together” the past and history, so
it is necessary to investigate what are the limits to the claims made by historians as to- 16 -
whether, and if so how, they know that they have achieved an adequate “stitching together”.
Jenkins argues that it is necessary to consider issues of epistemology, methodology and
ideology in conducting such an investigation.
Epistemologically, Jenkins notes the difficulty (indeed the logical impossibility) of
actually “knowing” the past when we are not presently experiencing it and all our evidence
comes in the form of texts (understood widely).  He suggests that historical knowledge “is
therefore likely to be tentative, and constructed by historians working under all kinds of
presuppositions and pressures which did not, of course, operate on people in the past”
[Jenkins, 1991, p. 10].  Jenkins concedes that what historians can say is constrained by “the
sources”, he asserts that “the same events/sources do not entail that one and only one reading
has to follow” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 13].  Interestingly, Jenkins suggests that, if there were only
one reading of the past, then, once this had been discovered, history as a practice would
indeed come to an end, as there would be no point in simply repeating over and over again
this one reading.  But one important factor that prevents this is that “through hindsight, we in
a way know more about the past than the people who lived in it” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 13].  We
can apply insights from the present to reinterpret the past, discovering what was forgotten and
putting things together in different ways.
Overall, Jenkins rejects a simple correspondence theory of historical truth, but he
must also address the other epistemological question of what, if  anything,  justifies the
historian in making certain statements.  He notes how a wide range of writers on history – he
quotes Geoffrey Elton, E. P. Thompson and Arthur Marwick as representing the diversity of
positions – argue that historical knowledge is possible, and ground the possibility of such
knowledge in rigorous application of “historical method”.  Yet Jenkins demonstrates that
there is no unique method on which all historians agree, not even a core of shared
methodological concepts.  Finally, Jenkins argues that the key question is not “What is
history?”, but rather “Who is history for?”.  History means different things for different- 17 -
people, and is mobilised for ideological purposes.  Even an appearance of neutrality and
objectivity may mask an ideological position – Jenkins makes great play of the conclusion to
Richard Evans’s In Defence of History
12 as representing a bourgeois standpoint by advocating
bourgeois virtues [Jenkins, 1999, p. 100].
Jenkins does not deny that there are “facts about the past” that we can definitely know
(for example, dates of well-attested events), but considers that “such facts, though important,
are ‘true’ but trite within the larger issues historians consider” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 32].  The
larger issues are “not only what happened but how and why and what these things meant and
mean” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 33].  It is this unavoidably interpretive aspect to historical writing
that Jenkins considers central, but interpretation is utterly discursive.  It is not the “brute
facts” but how they are arrayed and located within historians’ narratives that matter.
Moreover, even the documentary sources that historians, in Jenkins’s view, “fetishise” do not
have significance as evidence until they are mobilised as evidence for or against particular
interpretations.
Much of this, expressed in less polemic language, is accepted by many of the
historians that Jenkins seeks to criticise.  Evans [1997], for example, is happy to concede
some of these points (earning further criticism from Jenkins [1999, pp. 104-105] as
effectively trying to have things both ways, while merely exposing the inadequacies of the
“traditional” view of history still further).  It is Jenkins’s more radical conclusions that pose
stumbling blocks for historiographers such as Evans.  At the core of these conclusions is the
claim that “we don’t need a history in order to ‘place ourselves’ in present times, or for
thinking about our future or . . . for articulating identities and programmes for a reflexive,
emancipatory politics ‘without foundations’ ” [Jenkins, 1999, p. 202].  Jenkins goes beyond
the view he attributes to some post-modernists “that after the end of modernity (and
                                                
12 “I will look humbly at the past and say despite them all: it really happened, and we really can, if we
are very scrupulous and careful and self-critical, find out how it happened and reach some tenable though
always less than final conclusions about what it all meant” [Evans, 1997, p. 253].- 18 -
modernity-styled histoies) we might well expect to see as a constituent of postmodernity,
postmodern histories” [Jenkins, 1999, p. 10], to suggest that “to move into the future in
radical, emancipatory ways, postmodern imaginaries sans histoire are all we need” [Jenkins,
1999, p. 10].
So the conclusion reached by Jenkins is a literal end of history, not in the sense that
the one and only true history has been written (so historians have achieved their goal and can
close down their operations), but that a postmodern age is an age with no need for history.
This does not exclude the possibility of “imaginaries of the past”, but these make no claim to
be valuable because of their “truth”.  Does this leave us with simply the interplay of a myriad
of interpretations, in which “anything goes”?  Although Jenkins has stated that some (indeed
most) potential interpretations would be ruled out as inconsistent with “brute facts” or
involving failures of reasoning, this can only be so for histories that, despite their post-
modern pretentions, share many of the epistemological, methodological and ideological
positions of “modernist” history.  An “imaginary” may not excite or move us, but it can
scarcely be ruled out on the ground that it is not true – truth simply does not enter the
equation.  Thus Jenkins is quite correct to argue that a genuine post-modern history is
impossible, so a post-modern world would be a world beyond history.  This is because
history cannot avoid making truth-claims, no matter how epistemologically problematic these
are.  History involves making assertions that certain things did, and other things did not,
happen in the past, that they happened in certain ways and not in others, and that they can be
better understood using particular interpretations rather than alternatives.  This is essentially
the argument that Arthur [2001, p. 265] puts forward for auditing: “doing auditing properly
means being prepared to ultimately justify one’s methods, and . . . although the details of this
justification may be negotiated, there is an ultimately non-negotiable discursive framework
within which this can be done.”  If the arguments put forward by Jenkins lead to the- 19 -
conclusion that history (post-modern and a fortiori modernist) is impossible, then it is likely
that auditing will be impossible as well.
But are we obliged to accept the views of Jenkins?  One philosopher of history who
believes we need not is C. Behan McCullagh, whose most recent book, The Truth of History
[McCullagh, 1998] refers briefly to Jenkins, but goes further in defending the view that
“historical descriptions can be true of the past” and that “historical interpretations . . . are not
entirely subjective” [McCullagh, 1998, pp. 1-2].  McCullagh’s significant contribution, which
makes his work particularly appealing in the context of a study of auditing and financial
reporting, is that he considers that the issue is not just whether historical descriptions and
interpretations are “true” but also whether they are “fair”.  He argues that historical
statements are constrained by evidence, there is no disagreement in practice about many
historical statements for which the evidence is “large and unambiguous” [McCullagh, 1998,
p 22].  His conception of the practice of historians is that:
The conclusion which historians generally adopt is that if an historical
statement is well supported by abundant evidence, and much better supported
than any alternative account, then the statement can be rationally accepted as
very probably true.  It is always logically possible that the evidence is
misleading, or that their beliefs about it and the other beliefs on which they
base their inference are mistaken.  Indeed sometimes there is reason to think
that this is not just a logical, but a real possibility.  At any rate, even when it is
entirely rational to believe an historical description is very probably true,
historians must admit that it could possibly be false.  Historical knowledge,
like all our knowledge of the world, is fallible [McCullagh, 1998, p. 23].
It is only if we want guarantees that our statements and arguments can never be
refuted, not just practically but logically, that we will claim that accepting any fallible
historical statement is irrational, and that without certainty there can be no truth and hence no- 20 -
history.  McCullagh would regard this position of extreme scepticism as untenable.  He
recognises that our perceptions, our modes of argument and inference and our methods of
checking our conclusions are culturally shaped, but he does not see this as fatal to the
possibility that historical statements may be true.  He concedes that history is in this sense
subjective, but rejects the view that this implies that there is no truth (or falsity) in history,
and no way of assessing different historical interpretations.  Finally, historical statements are
expressed in language and are thus constrained by language, but the different conceptual
frameworks imposed by different languages do not prevent historical statements from being
true or false merely because they might have been expressed differently.
As regards historians’ claims that they aim at the discovery of the truth, McCullagh
concludes that, without such a concern, history would largely be pointless:
Why search for evidence of an historical period if it cannot reveal the truth?
Why weigh alternative implications carefully and rationally?  Why distinguish
plausible conjectures from well-supported facts?  What is the significance of
the carefully “constructed” accounts of the past which historians produce, if
they cannot be regarded as largely true descriptions of what happened?
[McCullagh, 1998, p. 57]
In a sense, McCullagh reaches a similar conclusion to Jenkins, although while Jenkins sees
such a conclusion as cause for celebration, McCullagh views it more as a  reductio ad
adsurdum of the view that historical practices cannot lead to the generation of knowledge.
However, he adds a qualification to the view that the goal of historical research is to make
true statements.  He notes that “descriptions are meant to be, not just literally true, but also
fair representations of their subject” [McCullagh, 1998, p. 57].  McCullagh has written more
extensively about the issue of fairness in historical narratives in a self-contained essay
[McCullagh, 1987], and in  The Truth of History he provides only a brief account.
Essentially, historical statements are “fair” if they are not “misleading”, and one instance of- 21 -
this is where statements “ignore major features of the property being described, and thus give
a misleading impression of the whole” [McCullagh, 1998, p. 58].  An implicit aspect of
fairness is avoidance of bias, particularly through omission of important facts: “A fair
representation is a balanced one, and historians are frequently at pains to correct the
imbalance of previous histories” [McCullagh, 1998, p. 58].  A fair description is also a
complete one, and McCullagh explains how this can be achieved without having to mention
absolutely everything about a historical subject, through ensuring that descriptions maintain a
consistent level of generality and detail, rather than placing the general and the particular on
the same level.
A critic of McCullagh might argue that the concept of historical truth he advances is
not immune from scepticism and relies heavily on the assertion that “It is not irrational to
believe certain thngs true of a subject just because there is a slight chance that those beliefs
are false” [McCullagh, 1998, p. 61].  Such a critic might argue further that the concept of
historical fairness is only sketched out, but even so appears to appeal to notions such as
balance, completeness, and absence of any tendency to mislead, that themselves are highly
subjective and may even be considered ( à la  Jenkins) to exemplify bourgeois ideology.
However, McCullagh’s analysis seems consistent with much of the so-called “new
accounting history” writing, which is perhaps less post-modern than it claims to be.
13  Its
appeal to both “truth” and “fairness” has obvious resonances to the auditor, and it is to this
that I now turn in the concluding section.
HISTORIANS, AUDITORS AND FINANCIAL REPORTING
If we accept the position of Keith Jenkins, then, except at the trite level, there is no
unique historical truth.  If a search for truth is constitutive of history, then history is
impossible and, in a post-modern world, we need to move to “imaginaries”.  It is immoral to
                                                
13 A suggestion also made by Funnell [1998, p. 157].- 22 -
attempt to impose a single view of the past as definitive, if there is no unique view of the past
that is superior to others (although there may be views that are inferior to others).  Jenkins
bases this argument in part on a claim that history is inevitably ideological, but mainly on the
epistemological disjuncture between the subject matter of history – the past – which is simply
inaccessible to us in the present, the infinite scope for interpretation of the texts that represent
the historian’s sources, and the lack of consensus as to the methodological practices of the
historian that are supposed to grant security to the historian’s interpretations and conclusions.
If we accept Jenkins’s arguments, then these seem equally to apply to auditing.  There
is again the disjuncture between the underlying transactions and events that are allegedly
being represented in financial statements and the traces that these transactions and events
may or may not be leaving.  Whether or not the traces count as persuasive audit evidence
depends on practice, but there is a lack of consensus over what best audit practice is, and
audit practice is not static but has changed dramatically over time.  This implies that any
particular set of audit practices is historically contingent rather than necessary, and there are
no grounds for believing that practices are “improving”.  There are many different accounts
that can be based on a given set of traces and accounting records, just as there are many
different “accounts” that the historian can give.  Although some of these accounts can be
ruled out as incoherent given agreement on the underlying traces, there is no one “true”
account.  Thus far, the analogy between historical research and auditing seems strong, but if
we accept Jenkins’s conclusion that, in a modernist world, history lacks foundations and, in a
post-modern world, there can be no history, then the analogy seems to imply that auditing
lacks foundations and, in a post-modern world, there can be no auditing.
McCullagh’s position is more favourable to auditing.  He concedes that historians can
“get it wrong”, but he argues that the practices of historians are likely, if properly carried out,
to “maximise the chance of arriving at the truth” [McCullagh, 1998, p. 57].  The view that
truth-seeking is constitutive of history, a stumbling-block to Jenkins, is an article of faith to- 23 -
McCullagh.  But truth needs to be tempered by fairness: mere correctness is not enough.  And
judgements of fairness cannot so easily be reduced to matters of practice and method.
Drawing out the analogy between history and auditing, the practices of auditors, which are
constantly developing, are likely, if properly carried out, to maximise the chance of reaching
a valid audit opinion.  It makes sense to argue, in the context of financial reporting, that not
only can the choice of accounting methods lead to different numbers, but that such a choice
can be deliberately made with a view of misleading.  Hence the motives of the preparers of
financial statements need to be critiqued, not just the statements themselves.  “Arguments to
the best explanation” may be valid within history, but where no single viewpoint emerges as
the “best explanation”, then it would be unethical for the historian to present a single position
as the only position.  Similarly, in financial reporting, if there is no single “true” accounting
(though there may be many “false” accountings), then it would be unethical for the auditor to
claim that a particular accounting represents “the truth”.  It is often forgotten that the British
audit report (and those of countries following this wording) states that financial statements
give a true and fair view, not the true and fair view.
Auditing, then, faces similar epistemological and methodological difficulties to
history.  If history is logically impossible, then so must auditing be.  If, however, there are
arguments that allow us to decide when historical statements are justified (even though we
concede that there is always the remote chance that they are not true), then similar arguments
may be used to justify auditing.  Hence this essay supports the view of Arthur [2001] that,
while the concept of audit evidence is important, the arguments used to convert traces into
evidence and evidence into conclusions are perhaps more important.  Perhaps, as Arthur
[2001, p. 262] points out, that “statutory auditing, as it is currently conceived and required, is
impossible”, but this does not make all auditing impossible.  The challenge to fundamental
theorists of auditing will be to learn from theorists of history as to which discursive
arguments are likely to vindicate some form of auditing.  In practice, just as historians rely on- 24 -
a core supposition that most traces of the past were not prepared to mislead but genuinely
correlate with occurrences and events, however open to interpretation they may be, so
auditors rely on a core supposition that accounting records are not prepared to mislead but
genuinely correlate with underlying transactions and events.  Sometimes historians are
deceived.  So are auditors, but only the extreme sceptic would argue that this makes both
history and auditing logical impossibilities.
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